




THE definition of condonation is well and fully given in the late
case of Keats v. Keats, 1859, 1 Swaby & Tristram 334, and we
propose to show that the decision of the Judge Ordinary (Sir
CRESSWELL CRESSWELL), affirmed by the full bench (Lord Chan-
cellor CHELMSFORD, WIGTMAN and CREsswELL, Js.) is sus-
tained by all the adjudications of the English and American
courts on the subject, and is in conflict, if at all, only with a few
loose dicta of the civilians copied into the text writers, and some-
times carelessly quoted by judges when the facts of the cases
before them did not render an examination as to their correctness
necessary.
It was attempted in that case to make out a case of condonation
by express words of forgiveness with respect to which there was
no dispute.
The Judge Ordinary, in charging the jury, after referring to the
fact that the Ecclesiastical Reports did not contain any precise
definition of what was meant by the word "condonation" in tho
ecclesiastical courts, says that he has come to the conclusion that
it means " a blotting out of the offence imputed so as to restore
the offending party to the same position he or she occupied
before the offence was conmitted."
The jury found that Mr. Keats had not condoned the adultery.
On motion for a new trial, for misdirection on this point, Lord
VOL. XIV.---41 (641)
CONDONATION.
Chancellor CHELMSFORD, giving the opinion of the whole court,
denying the motion, says that there can be no condonation
"which is not followed by conjugal cohabitation (i. e. not neces-
sarily sexual intercourse, which in certain cases may be impossi-
ble,-but a restitution of marital rights-a living together as
man and wife); and he further says that "the forgiveness which
is to take away the husband's right to a divorce must not fall
short of reconciliation, and that this must be shown by the rein.
statement of the wife in her former position, which renders proof
of conjugal cohabitation or the restitution of conjugal rights
necessary."
In .Ratcliff v. Ratcliff, 1 Swaby & Tr. 428, Lord CAMPBLL,
C. J., says, conforming to the decision in Keats v. Keats: "The
plea of condonation entirely fails as the doctrine on this subject
is now settled, for whatever Christian forgiveness the petitioner
may have been ready to extend to his wife after her fall, it is
clear he never intended, nor gave her nor any one else reason to
believe he intended, to live with her again as his wife."
Mr. Bishop, in the last edition of his work on "Marriage and
Divorce," comments upon the case of Keats v. Keats with appa-
rent approval, seeming, however, to be of the opinion that the
ideas intended to be conveyed by the Judge Ordinary were ade-
quately enough expressed in previous definitions of the term,
without resorting to new ones. Vol. 2, § 84 (1864), he says:
"The first instance in which a definition of condonation is laid
down in the English books, occurs in the report of a case tried
in 1858. There the Judge Ordinary instructed the jury that con-
donation means ' a blotting out of the offence imputed, so as to
restore the offending party to the same position he or she occu-
pied before the offence was committed.' The conditional nature
f the condonation was not presented by the facts of the case; if
it had been, the definition would probably have been qualified by
the insertion of the word ' conditional' before 'blotting.' The
judge considered that condonation means something more than
mere forgiveness; it implies a reinstatement of the wife in her
former matrimonial position towards her husband. On a motion
to set aside the verdict of the jury, the question of the correctness
of this definition came before the whole court, and the full bench
of judges concurred in holding it to be correct. Said -Lord
Chancellor CHELMSFORD : I I think that the forgiveness which is
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to take away the husband's right to a divorce must not fall short
of a reconciliation, and that this must be shown by the reinstate-
ment of the wife in her former position, which renders proof of
conjugal cohabitation or the restitution of conjugal rights neces-
sary.' Without undertaking to criticise this definition, and with-
out seeing any particular occasion to depart from the terms used
in our last section as descriptive of the condoning act," the author
would suggest as a fuller and more exact definition, the follow-
ing: " Condonation is the remission of a matrimonial offence
known to the remitting party to have been committed by the
other, on the condition subsequent, that ever afterward the party
remitting shall be treated by the other with conjugal kindness."
[This differs from the definition given in § 33, 354, and in the
previous editions of the work, in the omission of the word "for-
giveness" (from the careless use of which most of the inaccuracy
has arisen), and the use in its stead of the word "remission,"
equivalent in its effects to the words "blotting out," and imply-
ing the restoration of the wife to her former position.]
The same view of condonation as that expressed in Keats v.
Keats, is taken by Dr. LUSHINGTON, in Campbell v. Campbell
(1857), 3 Jurist N. S. 846. He says: "1Condonation is connu-
bial intercourse, with full knowledge of all the facts. Innocency
and condonation are inconsistent pleas, still they may be pleaded.
But the case tien resolves itself into this: ' You cannot prove
my guilt, but if you can, you have pardoned me.'"
The foregoing are the latest decisions upon the point,-made
upon the fullest consideration,-to the effect that there can be no
condonation per verba, unless it be followed by matrimonial co-
habitation and-a restoration of conjugal rights. (Whether-sexual
intercourse is necessary or not, has not- been decided,-probably
it would be, except in cases where from the age of the parties or
physical inability it is impossible.)
There is no case in the books either in England or America in
which condonation has been allowed as a bar without sexual in-
tercourse or matrimonial cohabitation, and the dicta of the judges
quoting the civilians, that the condonation may be expressed in
words if they are followed by "reconciliation," do not say what
meaning they attach to the word "reconciliation," or whether it
does not imply or amount to "matrimonial cohabitation."
In Snow v. Snow (1842), 2 Notes Cases 1, 16, per Dr. Lusu.
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INGTON: " Condonation, though a technical term, clearly imposes
the forgiveness of an offence done, and is stated by Sanchez and
some of the decisions in this court (Orme v. Orme, 2 Add. 382;
Dunn v." Dunn, 2 Phil. 9), to be of two kinds: the one remissio
expressa, by express words of forgiveness, and succeeding recon-
ciliation,-the other remissio tacita, and the remissio tacita in-
cludes a return to connubial intercourse."
Kent says, vol. 2, p. 78 (101): "So if the injured party sub-
sequently to the adultery cohabits with the other, or is otherwise
reconciled to the other, after just grounds of belief in the fact, it
is in judgment of law a remission of the offence and a bar to the
divorce."
By the statute of New York, the court may refuse to decree a
divorce, though the fact of adultery be admitted,-if the offence
has been forgiven and the forgiveness proved by express proof or
by voluntary cohabitation of the parties with knowledge of the
fact.
The word "forgiveness" in the statute would, we presume, be
construed in the light of judicial decisions as the equivalent of
"condonation:" Wood v. Wood, 2 Paige 108, Reviser's Notes.
" Condonation is not to be inferred from the husband and wife
being in the same house together, when they have separate beds,
and no sexual intercourse :" 2 Bishop, § 46.
"It is not necessary that the husband should instantly close
his doors upon an offending, and it may be, a repentant wife;
recollecting her former innocence, he may indulge at least in
some feelings of pity for her degraded situation, and until a fit
retirement is provided allow her the protection of his roof, but
not the solace of his bed ;" but he thinks, "condonation may pos-
sibly be inferred, more particularly against the husband, if within
a reasonable time the parties do not entirely separate :" Poynter,
Mar. & Div. p. 236.
"The general presumption is that married persons living in
the same house do live on terms of matrimonial cohabitation, but
this presumption may be rebutted by the circumstances of the
particular case :" Bishop, § 46,
Greenleaf Ev., vol. 2, § 54, says: "Where parties have sepa-
rate beds, there must, in order to show condonation, be some evi
dence of matrimonial connection beyond mere dwelling under the
same roof."
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Durant v. Durant, Hag. 1 Ecc. R. 788, per Dr. LuSnINGTON
(in his argument as counsel): " Condonation is where a husband
or wife cognisant of the adultery of the other, is voluntarily
reconciled."
Ayliffe's Panergon 226: " Afere residence in the house with-
out actual conjugal cohabitation is no condonation."
"Unde si," says Sanchez, "1 essent in eadem domo, non se allo-,
quentes divisique a mensa et lecto, quasi duo vicini extranei, non
censeretur condonatum adulterium:" Sanchez de Mat. Lib. 10
disp. 14, § 17.
And so in D'Aguilar v. D'Aguilar, 1 Hag. Ecc. R. Sup. 782,
per Lord STOWELL: "1 The parties returned to live together,-not
voluntarily on her part, and I cannot consider her acquiescence
as amounting to a complete forgiveness. It was almost an extorted
consent. There was no return to connubial cohabitation; for
though she slept in the house for a few nights, it was in a sepa-
rate bed, and though it is suggested that the separate bed was not
aired, yet the contrary is proved."
In Dance v. -Dance, 1 Hag. Ecc. R. 794, n., the wife remained
in the same house with the husband, occupying a separate bed,
however, aware that an incestuous connection with her sister was
going on.
The wife's permitting the husband, at the urgent request of
himself and mutual friends, to occupy for more than a year a
separate bed-room in her house, and to dine with her, does not
amount to a condonation: Trestmeath v. T-estmeath, 2 Hag. Ecc.
R., Sup. 1, 118.
The following cases also have a bearing to show that the mere
dwelling in the same house is not a restoration of conjugal rights,
-a restoration of the position of wife
A husband who has already dbserted his wife cannot so take
off the effect of the desertion as to prevent her right to a divorce
accruing by offering to support her either in his own house or
elsewhere. ' The offer,' said the court, ' was not to live with her
in the relation of husband and wife; and as she was by the na-
ture and terms of the marriage contract entitled to stand in that
relation to him, she was not bound to accept the offer to stand in
any other relation :'" 1 Bishop, § 779 ; Pishli v. Fishli, 2 Littell
(Ky.) 337; Moss v. .Moss, 2 Iredell (N. C.) 55.
And the refusal of a husband or wife to dwell with the other
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party to the marriage as husband or wife, is a desertion. The
withdrawal from the bed is a sufficient separation to sustain the
suit for desertion : 1 Bishop, §§ 778-781, 782, 799.
"The question, as one of principle, is not without difficulty.
Still, if a party to the marriage should refuse to the other what-
.ever lawfully belongs in marriage alone,-refuse, not from con-
siderations of health, not from any other temporary considerations,
but from alienated affections, or from perverted religious notions,
or from any other cause resting permanently in the will, and not
in physical inability,-7the refusing party would thereby volunta-
rily withdraw from whatever the relation of marriage distin-
guished from any other relation existing between human beings
is understood to imply, therefore he should be holden to desert
thereby the other :" Bishop, § 782.
And in Dillon v. Dillon, 3 Curt. Eco. 86, cited Bishop, vol.
2, § 42, Dr. LUsHINGTON. says: " Now I have always understood
the legal principle to be this, that when a husband has received
such information respecting his wife's guilt, and can place such
reliance upon the truth of it as to act upon it, although he is not
bound to remove his wife out of his house, he ought to cease
marital cohabitation with her."
In Wright v. Wright (1851), 6 Texas 22, it is said: "Their
living in the same house raises a presumption of.matrimonial
cohabitation; but this may be repelled by circumstances. In
this case a witness testifies that they had not slept together for
years, and this raises the counter-presumption that during this
temporary reconciliation they were not occupants of the same
bed. A return to live in the same house with the husband, but
without connubial cohabitation, does not operate so complete a
forgiveness as when there was a renewal of conjugal society or
embraces."
I4 the case of the wife, even conjugal cohabitation, with a full
knowledge of the crime, and without fraud or force, is not con-
clusive of condonation, but each case depends on its own circum-
stances: 2 Bishop Mar. and Div. § 52 ; D'Aguilar v. D'Aguilar,
supra.
In Popicin v. Pop kin, 1 Hag. Eco. R. 764, where the cohabita-
tion lasted from September to January 6th,-held not to be a bar
to wife.
In Curtis v. Curtis, 1 Swab. & T. 192, 200, where the wife
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left her native country with her husband and children for the
purpose of avoiding a separation from the children, and prevent-
ing their being left unprotected and alone in the hands of a cruel
father, the continued cohabitation was held not to amount to a
condonatiou.
In WTispell v. Wlhispell, (1848), 4 Barbour 217, 221, where
a divorce was granted to the wife, although there had been co-
habitation, PARKER, J., says: "If condonation may be inferred
from cohabitation, the presumption may be rebutted by the accom-
panying circumstances."
A late Alabama case holds that a wife complaining of a gross
act of cruelty was not barred, though she had continued the co-
habitation two years: Reese v. Reese, 23 Ala. 785 (cited) 2
Bishop, § 52. And see Gardner v. Gardner, 2 Gray (Mass.)
434, where the wife occupied same room and bed for a night after
the act of cruelty, held no condonation.
Quincy v. Quincy, 10 New Hamp. 272, is a valuable case, as
showing the amount and the character of testimony requisite tc
establish condonation.
In this case the husband, after full knowledge of his wife's
guilt, passed several days in the house with her,-told her seve-
ral times that if she had exhibited repentance he should have
tried to forgive and forget it,-stayed with her all night once
when she was il, lying down on one side of the bed during the
night,-held no condonation. Per PARKER, J.: "The evidence,
taken together, proves him to be a man of kind feelings, who
retained considerable affection for an erring wife, but fails to
make out a case of condonation. A mere promise of future for-
giveness, or an unaccepted invitation to the guilty party to return
to the matrimonial bed, with an offer of condonation on this event,
amounts to no more than a willingness to condone, or an overture
not binding until accepted, and subject to withdrawal like any
)ther offer; it is not condonation, it does not bar the remedy."
2 Bishop, § 47 (disapproving of case of Oltristianberry v. Chris-
tianberry, 3 Black. (Ia.) 202, which stands alone as holding a
contrary doctrine) ; Popkin v. Popkin, 1 Hag. Ecc. 766 ; Fer-
rers v. Ferrers, Id. 781, note; Peacock v. Peacock, 1 Swab. &
T. 183; Cook v. Cook, 3 Id. 137; Quarles v. Quarles, 19 Ala.
363.
"1 The contrary doctrine is so foreign to the spirit of all just
